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RECENT CASES
TAXATION-EQUITABLE ATTACK UPON TITLE BASED
UPON COUNTY IN REM FORECLOSURE
PROCEEDING
How good is title to land acquired through county in rem fore-
closure (sometimes called quieting title) proceedings? It a recent Flor-
ida case' the Supreme Court decided that title thus acquired was not
valid as against the claim of the equitable owner.
In 1921, the defendant had purchased six lots from the Board
of Public Instruction of Escambia County, but due to an error, one of
these lots, lot eighteen, was omitted from the record title. Defendant
went into possession, paying taxes on five of these six lots, for twenty-
two years thinking that he was paying taxes on all six lots. During
the first eighteen years of the Defendant's occupancy, this odd lot
was not assessed by the county, since the record title remained in the
School Board. From 1939 to 1942, the county assessed this lot to
"persons unknown". Later it was erroneously assessed to a third party.
In about the year 1945, the property was foreclosed for non-payment
of taxes, and in this county procedure title was adjudged to be in said
county. 2 In March, 1946, the county sold the land to the Plaintiff.3
Relying on his title, Plaintiff made demand on Defendant for posses-
sion which demand was refused. Plaintiff then proceeded in equity with
a rule to show cause. The court decided that in answer to the rule to
show cause, Defendant could offer any defense amenable to a suit in
equity. 4
This case seemed to turn on the Court's interpretation of that
part of Section 194.54 F.S.A. which reads that the purchaser of a tax
deed from the county may file a petition in the Circuit Court and
secure an order directed to the person in possession requiring him to
show cause why a writ of possession should not issue against him.
The person in possession is allowed five days to file his answer and
then the "matter shall proceed as in1 equity cases". -1Ii determining
that any equitable defense would suffice in this answer, the coulrt in
I
Whittington v. David, 32 So. (2d) 158 (Fla, 1947).
2 All proceedings were complete and regular, in compliance with the
provisions of Sec. 194.47, F.S.A.
3 The deed thus executed to Plaintiff was also complete and regular
as required by Chap. 194, F.S.A.
4 Therefore Defendant's claim that he had an attorney represent him
in his original purchase from the School Board, and that he had paid
his taxes, thinking he had paid taxes on all of the six lots, was suffi-
cient for the court to decide that Defendant's title was superior to the
record title of the Plaintiff.
sF.S.A. See. 194.54.
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reality reopened a case which had been finally decided-the original
county foreclosure proceeding. Should not the foreclosure proceeding
have been res judicata as to the title of the property? Sections 194.47
(4) and 194.53 F.S.A. seem to'answer this question in the affirmative.
There is no question raised in this case as to the validity of the county
in rem procedure. By said in rem proceedings, the court had 3urisdic-
tion. In a recent Florida Case, REINA v. HOPE,6 the court said that
the city in rem procedure "may be justified oni the theory that the
land owner is on notice that his taxes are due every year; that they
are required to support the government, and being so, the published
notice, without more, is sufficient, to apprise him that his lands will be
sold to satisfy his taxes." The city procedure is similar to that of the
county. 7 In referring to the county proceeding, another recent case
declared "if the decree is valid and regular on its face, the Defendants
were entitled to rely on it as being a new and independent title vested in
the county." In this last case the Plaintiff was not allowed to question
the title in the county after the final decree became absolute. The
final decree had also become absolute and complete in the case at hand;
should not the doctrine of res judicata have been controlling?
"Res judicata is defined as a legal or equitable issue which has
been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction; a thing or matter
settled by a judgment."' Res judicata rests on two principles. One: no
one should be twice sued for the same cause of action; two: it is in
the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation. 9
In applying these principles to the case at hand, we have first the
county foreclosing on the land in a valid in rem proceeding, and a
court of competent jurisdiction decreeing that title be vested in. the
county. Secondly we have the Plaintiff claiming through the county,
suing the Defendant, who, by virtue of the in rem suit, was put on
notice regarding the foreclosure proceeding on the land. Under what
principle of law could the first suit be reopened to be retried on
its merits unless there was a vital defect in the county in rem pro-
ceedings? The supreme court in deciding as it did, said, "In this
conclusion we do not overlook our holdingl0 . . . . that no sale or con-
veyance of real estate for the non-payment of taxes shall be held
invalid except ol proof that it was not subject to taxation, or that the
taxes had been previously paid, or that the property had been redeemed
prior to the execution and delivery of the tax deed. Neither do we over-
look the requirement of Section 42, C. 20722, Acts of 1941, as amended
6 158 Fla., 771 30 So. (2d) 172, (1947).
7 Green v. Smith, 157 Fla. 454, 26 So. (2d) 181, (1946).
9 Gray vi. Gray, 91 Fla. 103, 107 So. 261, (1926).
9 Coral Realty Co. v. Peacock Holding Co., 103 Fla. 916, 138 So. 622,
(1931).
io Bancroft Investment Corp. v. City of Jackson ille, 157 Fla. 546, 27
So. 2d 162, (1946); Reins v. Hope, 158,Fla. 771, 30 So. 2d 172, (1947),




by C. 22079, No. 19, Acts of 1943 F.S.A. Section 194.53, that after
the entry of the decree of foreclosure, all right, title, interest in or liens
on such property shall be cut off and extinguished dnd forever declared
null and void and the title to such lands when conveyed by the county
shall be construed in all respects as a new original title."
The court goes on to say that considering the- act as a whole, it
was not meant to "punish the man who makes an honest endeavor year
after year to pay his taxes as appellants were alleged to have done
in this case. Neither was it designed as a ruse to cut one loose from
a title that he was offering year after year to preserve." In so con-
struing the act, the court perhaps did do justice as concerned the
present Plaintiff, but what the court failed to consider was the vast
effect of such a ruling. What guarantee has the purchaser of prop-
erty from the county, said county having acquired title through valid
tax foreclosure proceedings, that the former owner will not come into
court and claim that he was "unlettered in the niceties of real estate
transactions"' 1 thereby nullifying the tax deed? Will title insurance
be written on any property where the chain of title has passed through
a county in rem foreclosure proceeding? In effect, the court has here
ruled that the title to such property actiuired from the county is not
a "new and independent title", 12 but one which is open to any equitable
defenses which the court may consider valid.
The effect of this decision will be far reaching unless it is reversed
or modified at some future (late. It is shocking to think that after an
equity cause is complete, absolute and final, its subject matter may be
relitigated de nova in a proceeding for a writ of possession or writ of
assistance. Attorneys should continue to litigate this question in all
parts of the state and on every possible occasion in the hope that the
court -will ultimately realize what disastrous effects such decisions
have upon real estate titles and will recede from its position.
i1 Note 1, supra.
12 F.S.A. 194.53.
FUTURE INTERESTS-CONTINGENT REMAINDERS-
I NTENT OF TESTATOR
It makes little difference whether the ultimate enjoyment of an
interest in remainder is dependent upon a cohli tion precedent or a
condition subsequent: if the right of enjoyment cannot be finallv assured
intil deterination of the particularl estate, a remainder is contingent
I "Particular estate" is a term of art used to denote the precedent
estate, consequent upon which a remainder vests In possession. "This
precedent estate is called the particular estate, as being only a small
part, or particula, of the inheritance. 2 Blackstone, "Commentaries on
the Laws of England" (1765), "164,
tVol. 2
